Abstract.-Financial crises of the last decade have been accompanied by large drops in output and total factor productivity. Existing literature has explained these outcomes through exogenous TFP shocks, the origins of which are unknown. In this paper, we build a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy with financial frictions on working capital. A sudden stop dries up borrowing from abroad and raises interest rates domestically. Financial frictions exacerbate allocative inefficiency and cause an endogenous decline in TFP, leading to a fall in output. The model can also explain other features of sudden stops (i) a current account reversal, (ii) a real exchange rate depreciation, (iii) a large decline in investment, and (iv) a deeper recession and a slower recovery for the non-traded sector. We calibrate the model using Mexican data and find that it can account for more than half of the fall in GDP following the 1994 crisis and is consistent with the real exchange rate depreciation, export boom, fall in investment and the subsequent slow recovery that characterized the Mexican economy after the crisis.
Introduction
Financial crises, such as the ones affecting Latin American and East Asian countries in the last decade, are valuable natural experiments to understand the connections between the real and financial sectors of the economy. In all these episodes, a sudden stop of new loans from abroad was accompanied by substantial real effects, including a large fall in output and total factor productivity (TFP), an even larger drop in investment, a reversal of the current account, and a large real exchange rate depreciation. 2 There is a large body of literature attempting to explain the causes of such crises. Models with self-fulfilling prophecies provide an explanation for speculative attacks in economies with solid fundamentals, which sometimes evolve into financial crises. 3 The episodes in Latin America and East Asia in the 1990s seem to fit this characterization: Countries with reasonable fundamentals and sound policies suddenly lose access to international financial markets. Recently, the focus of the literature has shifted towards analyzing the propagation mechanisms through which financial crisis affects real variables in subsequent years. 4 Dynamic general equilibrium models with two sectors can account for some of these real effects. As Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) show, a sudden stop can generate an increase in demand for traded goods, which must be satisfied domestically, increasing their relative price (a real exchange rate depreciation) and generating a reallocation of resources from the non-traded to traded goods sector. However, their model is unable to generate a drop in aggregate output and investment. In a frictionless environment, as the one used by Kehoe and Ruhl, sudden stops do not reduce TFP. To explain the real exchange rate depreciation and the output drop simultaneously, we either need to assume an exogenous fall in TFP or to specify frictions which would make the sudden stop look like a negative TFP shock.
In this paper, we follow the second route. We test the ability of a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions, modeled as a working capital requirement for intermediate goods, to account for the real effects of financial crises. In particular, we do not assume an exogenous TFP shock but let the model generate the observed drop in measured TFP as an endogenous response of the economy to the sudden stop. In our setup, interest rates act as a transmission mechanism of financial shocks to productivity and other real variables. We measure the strength of this mechanism using a quantitative version of our model calibrated to the Mexican economy during the 1994 crisis.
During the sudden stop, the domestic interest rate in the model jumps in order to increase the supply of domestic credit required to sustain firms' borrowing. The rise in the interest rate increases the cost of intermediate goods for firms, exacerbating a misallocation of resources which reduces current TFP. Notice that an increase in the price of intermediates, per se, does not generate a change in real GDP nor in TFP, as shown by Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) . In our model, the fall in TFP is due to an increase in the wedge between the producer and the user's price of intermediates, which distorts the allocation of resources between sectors. It turns out that this propagation mechanism is very powerful: In the quantitative model, we are able to account for between 50% to 80% of the observed drop in real GDP. Adding adjustment costs for labor and capital, the model is also consistent with the current account reversal, the real exchange rate depreciation, the fall in investment, the slow aggregate recovery and the different recovery path of the traded and non-traded sectors.
Our paper is closely related to Mendoza and Smith (2004) and Mendoza (2006) , which include financial frictions on both investment and working capital in an one sector open economy, RBC model. In their model exogenous TFP shocks are propagated by the credit constraints: in the current period by the working capital constraint (which causes a contemporaneous fall in output) and in the long term by the constraints on investment. A large crisis can be the result of a sequence of bad realizations of normal-size TFP shocks.
We take a different approach to the problem. In particular, we find no evidence of a sequence of bad TFP shocks before the crisis (which would show up as a slowdown in growth before 1994) and do not view financial crises as business cycle phenomena. Rather, we see them as unexpected events that economies need to adjust to. Our approach therefore, is to take the sudden stop as given, and see whether the financial frictions in the economy can endogenously generate a fall in TFP of similar magnitude to that observed in the data after the 1994 crisis. Since the crisis was associated with a substantial reallocation of labor and divergent trajectories of the traded and non traded goods sector, we also include costs of reallocation of labor, following Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) . To do this, we use a two sector model. One sector models, while informative about the aggregate economy, cannot explain the change in relative prices in the economy and the reallocation of resources it engenders.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some empirical evidence for the Mexican economy in the years prior and following the 1994 crisis, highlighting the features of the data that motivate our model and the main mechanisms that we incorporate in it. Section 3 introduces the model with working capital constraints which is calibrated in Section 4 to the Mexican economy. In Section 5, we perform the sudden stop experiment. Finally, we conclude.
Data
The big events associated with the Mexican crisis of 1994, namely the devaluation in real exchange rates, the drop in output and the current account reversal have been well documented. On December 20 1994, the government devalued the peso by 15% in response to capital outflows and a run on the currency. Two days later the peso was allowed to float when this proved insufficient to halt capital flight. By then, the nominal exchange rate had depreciated from 3.99 pesos to the dollar to 5.2 pesos. Between 1994 and 1995, the average nominal exchange rate depreciated by almost 90%. Coupled with a price increase of over 35%, this meant that the real exchange rate devalued by more than 55%. 
Year
RER Price Ratio Figure 1 shows two measures of the real exchange rate (peso to the dollar). The solid line represents the yearly average real exchange rate calculated by the Central Bank of Mexico against a basket of 118 currencies and uses the consumer price index. The dotted line shows the ratio of the prices in the tradeable (T) sector to prices in the non-tradeable (N) sector and is calculated as the weighted average of the price indices of all the economic activities that comprise a particular sector. The weights are calculated as the share of the activity in sectoral value added.
The increase in this price ratio due to the devaluation was 8%, a much smaller magnitude than the depreciation of the real exchange rate. The subsequent trend in this ratio however, mirrored the behavior of the real exchange rate and the series edged closer from 1998 onwards. In recent years they have been very similar.
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for Mexico measured as a spread over the US rate. The data is taken from Uribe and Yue (2006) and is from the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+). The US rate is measured by the three month rate on Treasury Bills less a measure of expected inflation. Real rates doubled from 5 to 10% between the last quarter of 1994 and the first of 1995, shooting up to 15% in the second quarter and remaining close to 10% for almost two years till the end of 1996. This rate measures the interest rate on sovereign debt in international markets, which is related to, but not the same as the cost of funds for the private sector. While it is hard to get a measure of the latter, Figure 4 shows the annualized rate on 28 day treasury bills in dollar terms. 5 This series is available for a longer time period than the EMBI, and is shown from 1988 to 2003. The interest rate fell steadily from 1988 to 1994. In 1994, the interest rate was about 7% which increased sharply to 46% in 1995. In 1996 it fell slightly to 30% and slowly declined to pre-crisis levels by 2002.
This large devaluation and increase in interest rates had immediate real effects. Figure 5 shows that GDP, which had been growing at about 4% per annum dropped by over 6% in 1995. This fall in GDP was accompanied by a fall in TFP. Bergoeing 5 In our model, all quantities, including the rate of interest will be expressed in terms of the traded good. The domestic interest rate in terms of dollars is the closest analog to this in the data and is calculated as the difference between the interest rate and the percentage change in the exchange rate over the previous period. Meza and Quintin (2006) show that TFP fell by over 8%. The fall in output was long lasting: while recovery in levels took place within three years, output remains substantially below trend levels till today.
This drop in output was accompanied by a fall in investment as well. Figure 7 shows that the investment output ratio fell from 20% in 1994 to 15% the following year. While recovery in levels took place in two years, like GDP, the ratio has remained below trend till recent years. Figure 8 shows movements in the current account. From a deficit of over 5% of GDP in 1994, the current account moved into a surplus of almost 4% in 1995. Exports went up by more than 30% while imports shrank by about half that amount. After the initial fall in imports, further current account surpluses were generated almost exclusively by the export boom.
Another well established fact is that the fall in output took place without a corresponding fall in labor hours or in capital (see for example, Bergoeing et. al. 2002, Kehoe and Ruhl 2006) . However, there was a sharp decline in the use of intermediate inputs as shown in Figure 9 , which fell in 1995 by over 5%.
The decline in intermediate goods use also shows up as a decline in trade credit. While data at the macro level are not available, data from firms listed on the Mexican stock exchange show that the stock of trade credit as a fraction of short term liabilities fell from 26% at the end of 1993 to 24% in December 1994 and further to 20% by the end of 1995. Recovery to pre-crisis levels occurred only by 1997. Finally, 21.1 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Actual Predicted Figure 10 shows energy consumption by the business sector from a series constructed by Meza and Quintin (2006) who document a fall of over 10% in 1995. Energy consumption levels did not recover till 1997. The effects of the crisis at a more disaggregated level are perhaps less well known. Using a variety of sources, 6 we construct a data set for macroeconomic outcomes of the traded and non traded goods sector. While the exact degree of tradability of goods is controversial, we follow standard practice in including agriculture, mining and manufacturing in the tradable goods sector and construction, transport, services, commerce, electricity, gas and water in the non tradable goods sector.
Our discussion is organized around three key facts: (a) The traded goods sector suffered a smaller drop in output and recovered faster than the non traded goods sector. This was accompanied by a reallocation of labor from the non traded to the traded sector. (b) While borrowing in both sectors declined, the traded goods 6 Gross output, value added and their sectoral decomposition come from the national income accounts of the Mexican statistical organization (INEGI). We estimate hours worked and wages in each sector from a nationally representative annual employment and remuneration survey. Total investment data also comes from the INEGI, which we decompose sectorally using weights implied by a survey of representative firms conducted by the Mexican central bank. The central bank also collects data on dollar and peso denominated debt indexed by the economic activity of borrowers from commercial banks, development banks and other financial intermediaries. Disaggregated sectoral data on debt contracted abroad is from an annual survey by the Finance Ministry. 
Actual Trend sector had substantially more access to credit from abroad than the non traded goods sector throughout the period. (c) The traded goods sector suffered a smaller drop in investment and recovered faster than the non traded goods sector Figures 11 and 12 illustrate these facts. Output in the traded goods sector, which was growing at around 3.2% before the devaluation, declined initially by 3% in 1995. In 1996, the traded goods sector made a strong recovery and output not only recovered, but surpassed trend growth within the next two years. The non traded goods sector on the other hand, faced an initial output decline of more than 7% after the devaluation. While growth resumed in 1996, output grew slower than in the traded goods sector and has remained below trend levels for the entire period.
As Figure 14 shows, the immediate aftermath of the crisis involved a reallocation of labor from the non traded goods to the traded goods sector. Prior to the devaluation, the ratio of hours worked in the latter relative to the former sector declined steadily from 0.36 in 1990 to 0.28 in 1994. The devaluation reversed this trend and in 1995 the ratio increased to 0.30 and to 0.32 in 1998.
The output collapse was accompanied by a credit collapse. The traded goods sector always had greater access to debt than the non traded goods sector, as evidenced by the higher debt to GDP ratio in Figure 15 . 7 From 1988 to 1993, the average debt to GDP ratio in the former was 22% compared to 6% in the latter. The devaluation in December 1994 increased the stock of debt relative to GDP by over a third for the tradable sector and doubled it for the non traded goods sector. From 1996 onwards, the debt to output ratio shrank rapidly as interest rates increased and banks What accounts for the divergent trajectories of the two sectors? There are several potential explanations. First, the non traded goods sector could have performed worse due to a sector specific shock to production. There is however no obvious candidate for such a shock empirically and theoretically, it begs the question of what such an asymmetric shock could be. Another explanation could be that the sudden stop reduced imports of traded goods and resources were reallocated from the non traded goods sector to the traded goods sector. While this could explain sectoral shifts, it is not enough to explain an aggregate fall in output. Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) add a labor adjustment friction to this story in an attempt to explain the aggregate fall in output as well as the sectoral reallocation. By themselves, such frictions imply that the reallocation of labor is accompanied by a rise in wages. In Mexico however, real wages fell from 1994 and have not recovered to pre-crisis levels. 8 Moreover, as Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) show, this is not enough to generate a fall in output during the crisis.
There is however, one feature which is specific to the traded goods sector, which can provide a potential explanation for the different experiences of the sectors. The movement of relative prices in its favor stimulates exports and allows it to buffer itself against the collapse in domestic demand. Indeed, outcomes for the traded sector were consistently better than those for the non traded goods sector. For example, it is well known that exporting firms invested more and had higher profits than non exporters in the years after the crisis (Pratap, Lobato and Somuano 2003) .
We therefore need to build a model that encompasses these features of the Mexican economy. The sudden stop, as manifested in an increase in interest rates, and a near cessation of borrowing from abroad must be related to a fall in intermediate good use. This generates a devaluation, or an increase in the relative price of traded goods. We need a two sector model to capture the effect of this relative price, i.e. the reallocation of labor from the traded to non traded goods sector and the export boom for the traded goods sector. In the next section, we build such a model.
An Economy with Working Capital Constraints
We build a simple model of a small open economy with two sectors, producing traded and non-traded goods. Both goods are used for consumption as well as for the production of an intermediate good and an investment good. In addition, the traded good is also exported. There is a representative firm in each sector which produces according to a decreasing returns to scale production function using capital, labor and intermediate goods. Firms own the capital and can freely issue equity in order to finance investment. Moving labor from one sector to another incurs a cost of adjustment of labor, which is borne by the consumer. This setup is so far equivalent to Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) . The only financial friction that we add is a working capital requirement for production: intermediate goods must be purchased in advance using (short term) borrowing in traded goods. In the small open economy, the interest rate for such loans is given by the world interest rate, plus an exogenous premium reflecting intermediation costs.
A representative consumer supplies labor to each sector, demands traded and nontraded goods and borrows or lends from abroad at the world interest rate. She does not own capital directly, but receives dividends from her ownership of firms. At each period, markets for the traded good, non-traded good, labor, the intermediate good and the investment good clear. We now describe this economy in detail.
The Model
Consumers The representative consumer is endowed with one unit of labor which she supplies inelastically. She consumes the traded (T ) and the non traded (N) sector goods with Cobb Douglas preferences, and can lend or borrow at the domestic interest rate r t measured in units of the traded good. In normal times (i.e., when a sudden stop does not hit the economy), this interest rate equals the world exogenous interest rate r * t . In a sudden stop regime, r t has to clear the domestic credit market. Her optimization problem can be written as:
where s t are consumer's savings, l T t is the fraction of the labor endowment supplied to the traded good sector, and π t represents aggregate dividends. We use the price of traded goods as numeraire, so that p n t is the price of non-traded goods relative to the price of traded goods (the inverse of the real exchange rate) and w 
The problem of the representative firm can be written as
Notice that since production is constant returns to scale, profits are zero in this sector. We cannot pin down the output of the intermediate goods sector from the supply side, but from market clearing conditions. There is also a representative firm in the investment good sector, combining traded good and non traded goods to produce the investment good. The problem of this representative firm can be written as
This sector also exhibits zero-profits.
Traded Good Sector A representative firm combines capital, labor and intermediate goods according to the production function:
with α T , ε T , υ ∈ (0, 1). Capital is owned by the firm and is accumulated through investment x t according to the law of motion:
with quadratic cost of adjustment for capital. A small adjustment cost is necessary to avoid negative investment after a crisis. Firms need to purchase a fraction θ of intermediate goods at the beginning of the period before production takes place using within period loans. These loans are contracted to financial intermediaries in units of the same traded good at the interest rate b r t+1 = r t+1 + µ t , where r t+1 is the domestic interest rate (equal to the world interest rate r * in normal times) and µ t > 0 is an exogenous country premium or financial intermediation cost.
The firm's problem can be divided into static and dynamic decisions. Given k and prices, firms must choose the level of labor and intermediate goods to maximize within-period profits
Notice that the cost of credit b r t+1 affects the effective price of intermediate goods for the firm. This problem delivers static decision rules for input demands: labor l The firm's dynamic problem can be written recursively as
The solution to this problem delivers the decision rule k 0T t (k) and dividends
Non-Traded Goods Sector The representative firm in this sector makes analogous decisions. The static decision (in units of the traded good) is represented by the problem
The problem delivers static decision rules for labor l 
Notice that the profits in the non traded sector are in units of the non-traded good, but borrowing is in units of the traded good. This mismatch will be partly responsible for the differential performance of each sector in the recovery. Notice also that we assume a common depreciation rate (δ), returns to scale (υ), fraction of intermediates subject to working capital constraint (θ), cost of credit (b r t+1 ), and adjustment cost for capital (ψ K ) for the two sectors. In other words, we are not building in any a priori differences between the two sectors to account for the divergence in their post-crisis experience.
Equilibrium The model is closed by imposing the following market clearing conditions: (i) for the intermediate good:
(ii) for the investment good: (v) the balance of payments identity
In the open economy, net exports equals net capital outflows, computed as the sum of consumer's net savings minus net loans by financial intermediaries. 9 
Domestic Credit Market
We define the excess demand of credit in the domestic market as the difference between firm's borrowing for working capital needs and consumers' savings:
In normal times, r t+1 = r * t and any excess demand of credit is absorbed by the world capital market. The balance of payments identity can then be written as
During the sudden stop, r t+1 corresponds to the domestic interest rate which equilibrates the domestic credit market, i.e., such that EDC t = 0.
Real GDP and TFP Measurement
Real GDP can be constructed out of the variables of the model. We need to be careful to use base year prices (let's call τ the base year) in order to have a measure of real GDP which is consistent with NIPA conventions. We use the following definition throughout this paper:
¢ this is, we compute real GDP as the sum of value added by each sector, everything in base year prices. We use τ = 1993 as the base year, following Mexican NIPA data. Having a measure of real GDP allows us to compute measured TFP using the Solow decomposition:
where α is the aggregate capital share. Notice that since labor supply is inelastic only changes in aggregate capital or TFP can account for changes in real GDP. 9 This identity implies the following market clearing for the traded good:
Notice that we include the labor adjustment cost as wasted resources in units of traded goods. Also, we subtract from the supply of traded goods the net amount of resources escrowed by financial intermediaries each period.
Calibration
We calibrate the model to match key features of the Mexican economy in the precrisis period from 1988-1994. Since our model is multisectoral, we use input output tables for information on the interaction between the sectors in the economy. The parameters calibrated and the statistics they match are summarized in Table 1 .
Consumption The consumption parameter λ can be calculated from the ratio of consumption of traded and non traded goods. The model implies that
which gives us a value of λ of 0.31.
Production Parameters Assuming a moderate degree of decreasing returns υ = 0.9, we use the following ratios to back out production function parameters. For the traded goods sector
Intermediates Consumption
Value Added
This gives us a value of ε T = 0.417 and α T = 0.342. We also know the share of traded goods used as intermediate goods in the traded goods sector. Noting that the production function
can be written as
we observe that
Traded goods used as intermediate goods
This implies that the value of φ for the traded goods sector is 0.737. Similarly, for the non traded goods sector
Intermediates Consumption Value Added
gives us α N = 0.250 and ε N = 0.662. Also in the non traded goods sector
This implies that the value of φ from this estimate is 0.317.
To get a value of φ for the economy, we use a weighted average of the two estimates. 
Investment goods producers
The ratio of traded goods used for investment to non traded goods used for investment also follows the ratio
This implies a value of η of 0.48.
Working capital constraint The fraction of intermediate goods that have to be bought in advance of production θ is calibrated using a combination of firm level data and macro data. This can be decomposed as The numerator of the first term is hard to estimate. However, from firm level stock market data we do have a measure of debt liabilities due within one year. Using the firm level data for the first ratio and NIPA data for the second, we get a value of θ = 0.7. We also experiment with a range of values to understand the importance of this parameter. 
Additional Parameters We set a depreciation rate of 10%. Output is detrended at the average population growth rate of 2%. We choose the scale parameters A T , A N , A x and A M to reproduce the share of the traded goods sector in output and employment. This completes the list of parameters described in Table 1 , which we will keep fixed along the whole paper. The adjustment costs of capital ψ K , the adjustment cost of labor ψ L and the initial consumer assets s 0 are chosen to match the transitional dynamics of the investment output ratio, labor flows and the current account deficit respectively. The interest rate series in the pre-crisis period is taken from the data as the interest rate on 28 day treasury bills in dollar terms as shown in Figure 4 .
Transition and Initial Conditions
We model the conditions previous to the financial crisis as the first seven periods of a transitional path for the model (1988-94) starting from the steady state (or balanced growth path) of the economy prior to a capital account liberalization. For simplicity we assume that before the liberalization the economy faced an intermediation cost of borrowing of 25% and solve for the steady state of the economy with such a high interest rate. At date 0, the intermediation cost falls to 1%. This is a crude way of Model Data modelling a financial liberalization as a reduction in intermediation costs for foreign borrowing. The important point is that it delivers, at date 0, an economy with a lower capital stock and a labor allocation skewed towards the traded sector, compared to the final steady state of the open economy with the low interest rate. Starting from these initial conditions, we compute the transition of the model towards the new steady state and focus on the seven initial periods. The evolution of output along the transition path (note that these represent detrended variables) is shown in Figures 16 to 18 .
The transition also shows the appreciation of the real exchange rate (as interest rates increase) and the increase in the current account deficit along the transition path in Figures 20 and 21 .
We do not attempt to match the sectoral investment rates since the data they are based on is not completely reliable. However we do match the aggregate investmentoutput ratio in Figure 22 .
Finally our model also predicts the shift of labor from the traded goods sector to the non traded goods sector.
We see therefore that our model generates an economy which looks very much like the Mexican economy on the eve on the crisis. Output was growing at about 2%, faster in the non traded goods sector than the traded goods sector. Wages were increasing commensurately. The real exchange rate was appreciating steadily and the country was running a modest trade deficit. 
The Sudden Stop Experiment (preliminary)
We perform the following experiment: Starting from the transitional path described above and calibrated to the pre-crisis years in Mexico, we hit the economy at date T = 8 with an unexpected sudden stop. At date T , corresponding to 1995 in Mexico, no new loans arrive from abroad, so firms must rely on consumers' savings to finance working capital. The sudden stop lasts for two periods (years), and this is perfectly anticipated by agents. At date T + 2, the economy can borrow again unlimited amounts at the world interest rate r * t . 10 
Interest Rate Response and Current Account Reversal
During the sudden stop, the interest rate for loans is given by the domestic interest rate which equilibrates the domestic credit market. In the first year, the interest rate rises to 55% as the supply of credit from abroad is suspended. This is higher than the observed rate of 48% in the data. In the second year, the domestic interest rate is 25%, whereas the rate in the data was 30%.
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The cut in foreign loans reflects directly in the current account. In the model, the ratio of net exports over GDP goes from a 12% deficit before the crisis to a 30% surplus in the year when the sudden stop occurs. A similar current account reversal is observed in the Mexican experience. As shown in Figure 25 , in the data and in the model, the improvement in the current account is short-lived and comes back to a small deficit in the following years.
Labor Reallocation and the Real Exchange Rate
The sudden stop implies that labor reallocates from the non-traded sector to the traded sector. Traded goods which were previously imported must be produced domestically.The reallocation of labor also generates a change in the relative price of traded vs. non-traded goods, which increase by 55% in the model (54% in the data). Figure 26 shows the response of the real exchange rate which is very similar to that observed in the data. Model Data
TFP and Output Effects
So far, the model is consistent with the rise in interest rates, the current account reversal, the reallocation of labor across sectors and the real exchange rate depreciation Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) obtained a similar set of results, based on the same sectoral reallocation mechanism. However, in their model without financial frictions this reallocation has neither output nor TFP effects, and the predictions for investment are ambiguous (an increase in investment for the traded sector, and a decrease for the non-traded sector). In our model the working capital constraint amplifies the effects of the sudden stop to real quantities, as Figure 27 shows. The model predicts a drop in real GDP (at constant prices) of about 4% after the crisis, all of which is accounted for by a fall in TFP. The data for Mexico shows an immediate drop in detrended GDP of 8%, so the basic model is able to account for 50% of this fall. The TFP drop, which is key to explain the real effects of the sudden stop in the model, is due to the working capital constraint. The jump in interest rates increases the wedge between the price of intermediate goods paid by users and received by producers, exacerbating the misallocation of inputs. Table xxx , we report the changes in real GDP and measured TFP in the period in which the sudden stop hits the economy (corresponding to 1995 in Mexico) for different values for θ, the fraction of intermediate inputs is subject to the financial constraint. As expected, the effect of the increase in interest rates due to the sudden stop (which we keep fixed along these alternative experiments) on TFP are much smaller when the working capital constraint is relaxed. This translates into smaller effects on real GDP. As θ approaches zero, we recover the original result in Kehoe and Ruhl (2006) . Without financial frictions, sudden stops cannot generate large drops in real GDP.
Sectoral Composition of Real GDP
The model has also predictions with respect to the sectoral composition of real GDP. While TFP drops for both sectors during the sudden stop because of the financial friction, there is also reallocation of labor from the non-traded to the traded sector. Hence, as Figures 28 and 29 show, the drop in value added (at base year prices) in the non-traded sector is bigger than in the traded sector, as observed in the data.
The model accounts for over 60% of the fall in the output of the non traded goods sector. In the traded goods sector we see a slight increase in output (less than 1%) before output decreases in the following year.
To be completed: We can choose the cost of adjustment of labor ψ L to match actual labor flows to the traded goods sector which will imply an initial fall in the output of the traded goods sector. 
Investment and Persistence
Finally, we test the predictions of the model with respect to investment. With the calibrated adjustment cost for capital the model predicts a drop in investment, close to that observed in the data as shown in Figure 30 . To be completed: The fall in investment is key to explain the slow recovery after the sudden stop. A counterfactual simulation without the sudden stop shows that GDP after the sudden stop remains below the levels it would have been for more than 10 years after the crisis.
Conclusions
Accounting for the real effects of a financial crisis, like the one affecting Mexico in 1994, is a difficult task without relying on unexplained, exogenous technology shocks. In this paper we explore the role of a particular financial friction, a working capital constraint to purchase intermediate goods. This provides a powerful mechanism to generate drops in output and investment following a sudden stop by exacerbating a static misallocation of inputs that looks like a TFP drop. Moreover, our model is also consistent with the increase in interest rates, the real exchange rate depreciation, and the current account reversal observed in these episodes. The mechanism behind the fall in TFP resulting from a sudden stop plays a central role in our analysis and is worth exploring further. Using a simple example we show that the constraint on working capital acts as a tax on the purchasers of working capital by introducing a wedge between the price paid by firms and the price paid to the intermediate goods producers. A sudden stop increases the size of this wedge and increases allocative inefficiency which shows up as a fall in TFP. We illustrate this insight in a simpler, static version of our model, which can be extended to the dynamic version. To do this, we shut down the intertemporal margin and firm heterogeneity and interpret a sudden stop as an exogenous increase in b r. Other simplifications of the model include the assumption of constant returns to scale for all sectors of the economy and limiting the differences to the technology in the traded and non traded sector to a scale factor. These changes allow us to see the underlying intuition behind this mechanism clearly.
This simple static economy is endowed with capital stock k 0 and one unit of labor. All quantities are expressed in units of traded goods sector output. We first describe a baseline model which can then be comparred to the model with the cash in advance constraint for intermediate goods. Our strategy will be to compare GDP in both economies and show that the cash in advance constraint is equivalent to a baseline economy with smaller TFP. We will further show that increases in b r will have the same effect as an exogenous fall in TFP.
A.1 Baseline Model
Consumers We assume that the endowment of k 0 and and one unit of labor is owned by the household, which are supplied to the traded and non traded sector firms.
The consumer's problem can be written as
Traded Goods Sector A representative firm in the traded goods sector combines capital, labor and intermediate goods to produce output according to a constant returns to scale production function
The firm's maximization problem can be written as
Non Traded Goods Sector As mentioned earlier, the production function of the non traded sector differs from that of the traded goods sector only in terms of the multiplicative term A N .
and the representative firm's maximization problem can be written as It is also straightforward to calculate GDP in this model. Calculating GDP as the sum of factor payments we have 
A.2 Economy with a Working Capital Constraint
We now introduce a working capital constraint into the baseline economy. Assume that intermediate goods need to be purchased before production takes place and they are financed through within period loans contracted at a rate b r. For the sake of concreteness we assume that firms borrow from households, although our results would be identical if firms borrowed abroad.
The consumer's problem can now be written as There are two things to notice here:
(1) The GDP in the constrained economy is equal to the GDP of the unconstrained economy times a factor
To see this, notice that for ε < 1, when b r = 0, the relation holds with equality. As b r increases, the left hand side decreases, so the inequality always holds. This is established by noticing that the slope of the left hand side is always negative Let g (b r) = r) for every unit of the intermediate good, the economy would be identical to the unconstrained economy. The misallocation arises because of the wedge between the prices paid for the intermediate good by the firm and those received by its producers and the economy is observationally equivalent to an unconstrained economy with a lower TFP. An increase in this wedge increases allocative inefficiency and looks like a fall in TFP. Figure 31 plots TFP for against b r for a range of values of ε. As the above analysis suggests, TFP is decreasing in b r. Higher values of ε shift the curve upwards. To get an idea of the quantitative importanceof this mechanism, Table 1 shows elasticities of TFP with respect to interest rate changes from 5% to 16%. The effects of a sudden stop are potentially large. TFP falls by 3 to 5% depending on the value of ε. We should therefore expect to see a fall in TFP resulting from a worsening of allocative inefficiency as a result of a sudden stop. In t e r e s t Ra t e TFP e p s ilo n =0 .3 4 e p s ilo n =0 .3 8 e p s ilo n =0 .4 2
